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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Rarely a month passes-by in Pakistan without complains on the state of basic 
commodity markets, be it wheat or sugar, cotton or rice. Prices are too high for the 
consumers, or too low for the farmers; and often the government is asked to intervene, 
buying for or selling from stocks, prohibiting export or import, increasing or reducing 
import duties, introducing/withdrawing export taxes, or taking other measures to protect 
the consumer or producer. It is as if domestic prices can have a life on their own, with the 
government asked to guarantee “fair” prices for everbody. 
The resulting on-and-off policy intervention by the government is likely to have 
had a deleterious effect on the development of the domestic and international trade for 
these commodities. This is because of the uncertainty so generated, with the private 
traders always facing the risk of a regime change at a time when import or export 
contracts have already been signed. As a result too, the role of the state-owned Trading 
Corporation of Pakistan self-perpetuates, even if the government would like to see it 
minimised, as it is always being asked to intervene because of the private sector’s 
“failings”. 
The purpose of this  paper is not to analyse the extent of the under-development 
of commodity markets in Pakistan, although this would be an interesting topic of its 
own. Instead, the paper will look at whether the modus operandi, including government 
interventions, on the domestic commodity markets have succeeded in isolating 
domestic commodity prices from developments in the exchange rate and international 
prices, in other words, escaping the “law of one price”. Departures from the law of one 
price have implications not only for the welfare of consumers and producers, and 
efficiency, but also for inflation forecasting and the macroeconomic adjustment to 
terms of trade shocks. In particular, they would make it possible for domestic relative 
prices to differ from those dictated, inter alia, by the international markets.12  
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Furthermore, the prices of wheat and other key agricultural commodities are important 
direct or indirect determinants of the CPI. Since these commodities are close-to-perfect 
“traded-goods”, monetary policy should be expected mostly to determine their 
domestic prices through its impact on the exchange rate, taking the developments in 
international prices as exogenous. If other mechanisms are at work, monetary policy 
would need to integrate them into any model of inflation forecasting.  Section 2 takes a 
descriptive look at the data. Section 3 proposes a  “political economy of domestic 
prices adjustment” able to explain some of the observed price dynamics. Any domestic 
or external shock that threatens to make one of the market participants (consumers or 
producers) worse off brings about attempts to resist the adjustment, with or without the 
help of government. Section 4 uses a general co-integration approach to test (1) the 
existence of a long-run relationship between the domestic prices, the exchange rate, the 
international prices, and, when applicable, the domestic “support” prices; and (2) 
whether the law of one price applies, at least in a “weak” sense, allowing for a possible 
constant wedge between domestic and international prices. The associated short-run 
dynamics, in the form of an error correction mechanism, are also discussed. Section 5 
summarises the findings of the paper and draws policy recommendations. The main 
conclusions are: 
 
There is only weak evidence of co-integration between domestic price, 
international price, exchange rate, and domestic support price (when applicable) 
for key agricultural commodities in Pakistan. Only in the case of wheat is the 
evidence stronger, but it is mainly on account of the inclusion of the support 
price variable. 
The elasticity of domestic prices to a change in the exchange rate is close to 
unity for all commodities. In contrast, the elasticity of domestic prices to a 
change in international prices is close to unity only for cotton and rice. In the 
case of wheat and sugar, they are much smaller than unity. 
The hypothesis that the “weak” law of one price applies in the long-run can be 
rejected in the case of wheat and sugar, but cannot be rejected in the case of 
cotton and rice. 
The above results are broadly consistent with a theory of domestic price 
determination that emphasises political economy considerations when markets are subject 
to domestic and external shocks, real or monetary, leading to government interventions. 
While departures from the law of one price, even in the case of homogenous 
commodities, have been observed in advanced market economies as well, the extent of 
the departures in the case of wheat and sugar in Pakistan is striking. Thus, there appears 
to be room for improving the functioning of domestic markets for agricultural products, 
including through a reduction in government interventions and enforcement of more 
competitive behaviours, away from the current modus operandi. Under the current state 
of affairs, monetary policy needs to consider more complex price dynamics for the 
purpose of inflation forecasting. The necessary macroeconomic adjustment (equilibrium 
real exchange rate) to terms of trade shocks would also be hampered, potentially resulting 
in greater instability of the trade balance.  
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2.  A DESCRIPTIVE LOOK AT THE DATA 
In this section, we look at charts depicting times series of domestic prices (in PRs) 
and international  “parity” prices (i.e international prices in US$ converted in PRs at the 
market exchange) for wheat, cotton, sugar, and rice (Charts 1a, 1b, 1.c, 1.d). Time series 
depicting domestic prices expressed in US$ at the market exchange rate, and international 
prices in US$ also guide the interpretation (Charts 2a, 2b, 2c, 2d). International prices for 
wheat are taken to be US Gulf Ports; for cotton, Liverpool; for sugar, Caribbean (New 
York); and for IRI rice, Thailand.23  In the case of wheat, for which there exists a long 
time series of domestic support prices, the charts also plot these prices, expressed in PRs 
and US$, respectively.34  
For wheat and cotton, the domestic and international “parity” prices appear close 
to each other, if we look at average levels; for sugar, the domestic prices have been 
systematically higher than their international parity prices based on Caribbean (New 
York) prices; and for rice, the domestic prices have been systematically lower than their 
international parity prices based on the Thailand prices. For sugar, the (positive) 
discrepancy would be explained by the systematic protection offered to local sugar 
producers; for IRI rice, the (negative) discrepancy appears to reflect quality differences, 
as well as a relatively weak market infrastructure. 
The time series display some interesting properties. First, while, in general, 
domestic and international parity prices appear to move together, domestic prices tend to 
be more stable, whether we look at prices in PRs or US$. This is especially the case for 
wheat, apparently refecting the effectiveness of domestic support prices. One exception 
are domestic cotton prices, which, if at all, appear more volatile than their international 
parity prices (Table 1).   
Table 1 
Variance Comparisons1 
Commoditiy ln(p*) ln(p) – ln(e) 
Wheat 0.034 0.014 
Rice 0.037 0.023 
Sugar 0.080 0.025 
Cotton 0.050 0.072 
1Sample Variance.   
2International Financial Statistics (IFS), IMF. 
3The Ministry of Agriculture also publishes a list of support/ intervention prices for rice and cotton 
(seed). In contrast to the case of wheat support price, they operate mainly as indicative prices, with very limited 
government intervention taking place at those prices. An initial effort to integrate them in the empirical analysis 
suggested their irrelevance. Therefore, we have excluded them from the analysis reported in this paper.  
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Chart 1a: Domestic Price and International Parity Price of Wheat
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Chart 2a: Domestic Price (in US$) and International Price of Wheat (in US$)
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Chart 1b: Domestic Price and International Parity Price of Rice
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Chart 1a. Domestic Price and International Parity Price of Wheat 
Chart 2a. Domestic Price (in US$) an ternational Price of Wheat (in US$) 
Chart 1b. Domestic Price an  ternational Parity Price of Rice 
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Chart 2b: Domestic Price (in US$) and International Price of Rice (in US$)
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Chart 1c: Domestic Price and International Parity Price of Sugar
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Chart 2c: Domestic Price (in US$) and International Price of Sugar (in US$)
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Chart 1d: Domestic Price and International Parity Price of Cotton
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Chart 2d: Domestic Price (in US$) and International Price of Cotton (in US$)
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Second, there is evidence of fairly long periods of time during which domestic 
prices have tended to be systematically higher or lower than their international parity 
prices (in the case of sugar and rice, this statement must be understood as the wedge 
between the two prices being systematically higher or lower than on average). This is 
particularly striking for wheat during 1989-90, 1996-97, and 2003 (domestic prices 
lower), as well as 1998–2000 and 2005-06 (domestic prices higher). Typically, when 
international prices for wheat (in US$) have surged, domestic prices have not followed 
up, and the same has been true when international prices have dipped, suggesting, in the 
first instance, that measures were taken to protect the domestic consumers, and in the 
second instance, the domestic producers, including through the support price mechanism. 
Cotton prices since 2004 offer a striking contrast, with domestic prices in 2004 falling 
more than their international parity prices, and remaining below. The reason appears to be the 
bumper crop of 2004-05, which was allowed to strongly impact on domestic prices, thereby 
providing especially cheap inputs to the textile sector, with cotton exports only partially 
picking up the excess supply. A similar situation appears to have prevailed in 1999. 
Chart 1d. Domestic Price and I tional Parity Price of Cotton 
Chart 2d. Domestic Price (in d International Price f Cotton (in US$) 
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Since the second half of 2005, measures have been taken to prevent the surge in 
international prices for sugar to all time highs to lead to a similar increase in domestic 
prices, including the removal of pre-existing protective duties and taxes, and a ban on 
exports. As a result, the positive wedge between domestic and international prices has 
virtually disappeared. This is in sharp contrast with the 1998–2000 period during which a 
sharp decline in international prices was accompanied by only a marginal decline in the 
domestic prices, resulting in a widening of the wedge bewteen the two prices.   
3.  THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
This section provides a simple theoretical framework to analyse the empirical 
observations. If domestic prices fail to reflect international prices at prevailing exchange 
rates for long periods of time, what is inhibiting the international price arbitrage for those 
key agricultural commodities? 
There are obvious reasons why the law of one price may not fully apply, such as 
quality differences, imperfect market development, systematic protection from imports or 
discouragement of exports,  transportation bottlenecks and thus costs, or simply statistical 
problems with the price series used. Many of these factors appear to have been fairly 
constant in the period studied, though the possibility of structural and systematic policy 
shifts, and thus the so-called Lucas’ critique, must be recognised. Here, we will focus on 
factors more directly related to the short-run functioning of markets, in particular possible 
interferences  (by government or others) in the competitive market mechanisms on behalf 
of one or other participant when those markets are subject to domestic and external 
shocks. The analysis will, in particular, highlight the political economy considerations 
underpinning these interventions.  
It is convenient to think of the following demand and supply functions for 
commodity i:   
di  = ai  (M/pi)  ^ ci … … … … … … … (1) 
where:      
di = demand for commodity  i  
ai , ci = fixed parameters  
M = money stock  
pi = domestic price of commodity i 
si = ki  (w/pi) ^ bi … … … … … … … (2) 
where:  
si = supply of commodity  i  
ki, bi = fixed parameters   
w = domestic money wage  
Furthermore, we will make the simplifying assumption that the domestic money 
wage is constant in foreign currency (US$) terms,45 i.e.: 
w  =  e w* … … … … … … … (3)  
4This is to abstract from peripheral issues. 
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where:  
w* = fixed US$ wage  
e = exchange rate (PRs per US$)  
Fig. 3a.  
Fig. 3b.   
Fig. 3c.  
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Fig. 3d.   
  
Fig. 3e.  
Figure 3a  illustrates a market equilibrium for which it happens that  pi  =  e pi*, 
where pi* is the international (US$) price for commodity i, i.e. the law of one price 
applies, and furthermore, autarky prevails at this equilibrium (neither export nor import). 
Equilibrium point  A is a useful benchmark. 
Four types of shocks are considered. In each experiment, we limit the discussion to 
the cases where the direction of shocks point to at least one of the market participants 
(i.e. the demand/ consumer or supply/ producer side) being made worse off by not 
resisting the market mechanism/ trade. This can perhaps be viewed as a sufficient 
condition for any real pressure to resist the market mechanisms to materialise. With this 
qualification, the following shocks are highlighted.  
(1) Negative Domestic Supply Shock, in the form of downward shift in the supply 
parameter  ki, for example the impact of poor rains (Figure 3b). If the law of one 
price continues to prevail, the market equilibrium moves from A to A’, with the 
country importing AA’. Clearly, the domestic producer would prefer to move from 
A to B rather than to A’, i.e. the no-trade option.  Preempting imports would allow 
epi*”
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the producer to limit its losses from the adverse supply shock. If he is successful, 
the law of one price will generally cease to apply.56 Any domestic support price at 
the initial equilibrium price would then become ineffective.   
(2) Negative Domestic Demand (Non-monetary) Shocks, for example impact of 
adverse shift in preferences or perceived lower permanent income (Figure 3c). 
The market equilibrium moves from A to A’, with the country exporting AA’. 
In this case, it is the consumer who would prefer to see the market equilibrium 
moving from A to B rather than A to A’. Any domestic support price at the 
initial equilibrium price would become effective in support of an export 
scenario.    
(3) Shocks to International Commodity Prices. Everything else the same, 
including the exchange rate, an increase (decrease) in international commodity 
prices, if passed-through onto domestic prices, would decrease (increase) 
domestic demand and encourage (discourage) domestic supply and exports 
(imports). In the event of an increase in international prices, domestic prices 
could remain unchanged if the government introduces an export ban or export 
tax to protect the consumer. Any domestic support price at the initial 
equilibrium price would become ineffective unless accompanied by an export 
ban. In the event of a decrease in international prices, domestic prices could 
remain constant if imports are discouraged by a ban on imports or the 
imposition of import duties to protect the producers. Any domestic support 
price at the initial equilibrium price would become effective if accompanied by 
an import ban. In either case, interference would preempt domestic prices to be 
consistent with the law of one price (Figure 3d). 
We complete this theoretical discussion by considering one type of shock for 
which there does not appear to be any incentive for neither the producer nor the consumer 
to block the market mechanism, the case of a purely monetary/ exchange rate shock.  
(4) Monetary/Exchange Rate Shocks to Demand and Supply, for example an 
increase in the money stock leading to a proportional depreciation of the 
exchange rate (Figure 3e). There appears to be  no obvious reason preventing 
the equilibrium to move from A to A’, with the depreciation of the exchange 
rate being fully passed through onto the domestic price, and the  law of one 
price continuing to prevail. Any domestic support price at the initial 
equilibrium price would have to increase proportionally not to become 
ineffective. 
Thus, the analysis also suggests that some types of shocks are more likely to 
induce intervention in the competitive market mechanism than others. In particular, 
“real” shocks in the domestic supply and demand, and in international prices appear more 
likely to induce such intervention, and thus failure of the law of one price, than purely 
“monetary/ exchange rate” shocks.   
5In the case of a positive supply shock, the surplus could simply be exported, leaving the consumer 
unaffected and the producer better off. However, as observed, with the bumper cotton crop of 2004-05, the 
consumer (the textile sector) was apparently allowed to benefit from domestic prices lower than international 
prices. 
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The intuitive analysis presented above suggests that, in practice, actual domestic 
prices could turn out to be some weighted average of the no-trade equilibrium domestic 
prices, obtained from di = si, and of the international parity prices. Assuming that the 
weights are  and (1- ), respectively, we derive:67 
ln pi  =  [ (ln ai – ln ki – bi ln w*) / (ci–bi) ] +   [ (–bi ln e + ci ln M) /  
            (ci–bi) ] + (1– ) lne + (1– ) ln pi* … … … … (4) 
Assuming that   M/e is always constant, and without loss of generality that it is 
equal to 1, expression (4) reduces to: 
ln pi =  [ (ln ai – ln ki –bi ln w ) / (ci–bi)]  +  ln e  + (1– ) ln pi* … … (5) 
Note that the coefficient for ln e  is unity.78 
An interesting question is whether it is reasonable to assume that the 
contemporaneous international price alone enters the domestic price equation in the linear 
fashion assumed, irrespective of its absolute level. The Charts 1 and 2, for wheat in 
particular, clearly suggest that this is not the case; temporary spikes or collapses in 
international prices are less passed-through. Some notion of “normal” international prices 
seems to play a role in the determination of domestic prices. 
In the case of wheat, the domestic support price (expressed in US$)89 appears to be 
a reasonable proxy for that “normal” price. Because in Pakistan procurement at the 
support price covers only a fraction of market transactions, domestic market prices can of 
course differ from the support price. To reflect the above considerations, we expand 
Equation (5) into Equation (6) as follows: 
ln pi = a0  +  ln e  + (1– ) (1– ) ln pi*  + (1– )  ln pi* … … … (6) 
where  pi*  is the support price (expressed in US$) and  0 =  = 1. 
It is worth illustrating one theoretical prediction from Equation (6): assume 
that between two time periods, both the international price (in US$) and the support 
price, usually set in domestic currency terms, are fixed, but that there is a monetary 
shock leading to a proportional exchange rate depreciation. Equation (6) suggests 
that the impact on the domestic price for wheat will be    ln e – (1– )   ln e,910 
which could be small if the wheat market is open to international trade (i.e. (1– ) is 
close to unity) and there is a strong support price policy set in domestic currency 
terms ( i.e.   is close to unity). Under such circumstances, a monetary/ exchange rate 
shock, everything else remaining the same, might have little pass-through on the 
domestic price. 
Generally, one could expect the support price to influence differently the 
domestic market prices when the support price is effective, i.e. when it is higher than 
the international price, than when it is ineffective. And conversely for the influence  
6When there is a systematic wedge between domestic and international parity prices, the weighted 
average is between the no-trade equilibrium price and ln  + ln p*, where the constant  is the wedge.  
7Ardeni (1989) does not allow for differentiated impact of the exchange rate and international price. 
8Expressing the domestic support price in US$ is consistent with the theoretical reasoning of the 
previous Section. 
9Recall that with a fixed support price in domestic currency terms, a depreciation of the exchange rate 
will reduce the support price in foreign currency terms proportionally. 
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of the international price. Thus, one might have to allow for two different “regimes” 
in the relationship, although the experience has been that official procurement still 
goes on at the support price when it is below the international price, simply because 
of the reliability of the official procurement system, especially for small farmers. In 
addition, the domestic support price tends to serve as a benchmark for the private 
procurement as well.  
We did in fact perform for wheat the econometric analysis described below 
under various regime specifications using dummy variables and data partitioning. 
Results were statistically poor, and generally not supportive of the view that the 
support price variable looses its significance when it is not effective, as defined 
above (in fact sometimes the opposite was suggested!). This might be because, even 
when the support price is not effective, the domestic price movements might still be 
more closely correlated with the support price movements than the international price 
movements.1011It is also worth noting that the support price was effective, as defined 
above, for only 75 out of 214 observations. Accordingly, these regime specifications 
are not further discussed below.  
4.  ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS 
The domestic price equation of expression (6) above has the following immediate 
empirical counterpart (omitting from now on the subscript i, and for the moment  the time 
subscript t as well): 
ln p
  
=  a0  +  a1 ln e  +  a2 ln p*  +  a3 ln p
 
*  +  … … … (7) 
where the domestic supply and demand shocks can be viewed as incorporated 
within the random variable  .1112If the law of one price strictly  applies, in addition to the 
theoretical prior a1 = 1  we also have a0 = 0; a2 = 1 ; and  a3 = 0.1213In what follows, we 
will mostly be interested in whether the “relative” law of one price applies, i.e. we allow 
for the constant a0  to be different from zero. 
Since we will use long monthly times series data and we suspect non-stationarities, 
co-integration techniques to estimate Equation (7) is the right approach. 
The first step is to analyse the statistical properties of each data time series yt. The 
generalised model accommodating higher-order autoregressive process for the error term is: 
tjt
p
j
jttt yyy
1
1 … … … … … (8)  
10The simple correlations between the domestic price and support price (in US$ terms) is 0.7 and 0.6 
using the partitioned data set for which the support price is effective, and not effective, respectively. Both are 
significantly higher than the correlations between the domestic price and international price under the same data 
partitioning. 
11The paper by Khan and Schimmelpfennig (2006) provides support for a link between the domestic 
support price for wheat (in PRs) and domestic inflation, albeit only in the short-run. Here, the analysis allows 
for a distinction between adjustment in domestic support price (in PRs) which reflects adjustment to inflation 
(via the exchange rate), and that which reflects  independent shock  from the domestic support price (in US$). 
12If ln p* is independent of ln p*,  a3 = 0 is clearly the correct statistical interpretation of the law of one 
price. If ln p* were not independent of ln p*, in the extreme case for instance if ln p* directly follows ln p*,  a2  
+  a3  =  1 might, trivially, be a proper interpretation of the law of one price. 
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The augmented Dickey-Fuller test for the existence of a unit root has the null 
hypothesis  = 1 ; the lag length is up to the last lag for which the estimated coefficient is 
statistically significant according to the t-statistic.  
The null hypothesis of a unit root cannot be rejected for all (log of) domestic 
prices time series. Furthermore, the statistically significant estimated lag coefficients 
indicate that (log of) domestic prices for wheat, cotton, rice, and sugar are all I(1) time 
series, i.e. integrated of order one. The same is true for the (log of) exchange rate (PRs 
per US$) time series, as well as for the (log of) support price (in US$) time series. On 
the other hand, the null hypothesis of a unit root can be rejected for all (log of) 
international prices (in US$) time series, which appear to be I(0), i.e. stationary, though 
not at the 1 percent level. Sugar also appears to be an exception, and integrated of order 
1, I(1) (Table 2). Since the stationarity test for the international prices (in US$) is weak 
on the level of prices, but improves significantly when taking the first difference, we 
can reasonably assume in what follows that all series are integrated of the same order 1, 
and thus proceed with co-integration. In any case, even if we did not assume 
integration of the same order 1, we can still proceed with the Johansen (1988) co-
integration approach because it appears to require only that the time series be at most 
I(1);  alternatively, we can re-arrange Equation (8) to read it as involving only time 
series which are I(1).1314 
First we can relate our finding of weak stationary properties of international prices 
for agricultural commodities with the literature on the persistence of shocks affecting 
these prices. If agricultural commodity price series have (or are close to have) a unit root, 
then shocks would have permanent (long lasting) effects. 
The knife-edge nature of unit root tests, such as the ADF test, has been criticised 
by Cashin, Liang, and McDermott (2000), who use the median-unbiased estimator 
technique proposed by Andrews (1993) to obtain an exact point and interval estimate of 
the autoregressive parameter in the commodity price data, and to derive from this, 
measures of the duration of typical price shocks. These authors find that on average 
shocks to commodity prices are very long-lasting. For instance, they find that the length 
of time until the impulse response of a unit shock to an economic time series is half its 
initial magnitude is almost 4 years for wheat, 9 years for (free market) sugar, 8 years for 
rice, and 12 years for cotton. The policy implications of such results are important, as 
they suggest that measures aimed at stabilising domestic prices, including explicit or 
implict stabilisation schemes, are unlikely to be optimal, because very costly to the 
budget, or in terms of welfare and allocative efficiency.  
We view these findings as consistent with our unit root tests, and therefore will 
argue that deviations from the (weak) law of one price, as a result of attempts to de-link 
domestic prices from developments in the international prices for the purpose of 
protecting the consumers or producers are unlikely to be welfare or efficiency improving 
in the long run.    
13
 Equation (8) can be re-written as: 
(7’)  ln p
  
=  a0  +  (a1 – a2 –  a3) ln e  +  a2 (ln p* + ln e) +  a3 (ln p
 
* + ln e)  +  
in  which all time series are in fact I(1). The co-integration test and as estimated under the Johansen 
approach for Equation (7’) turn out to be the same as those for Equation (7).   
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Table 2 
Unit-Root Tests on Individual Series 
tjt
p
j
jttt yyy
1
1
1 
Variables Level ADF 1st Difference ADF Order of Integration 
Exchange Rate      
      Ln(e)2 –1.22 –9.37*** I(1) 
      Ln(e)3 –1.80 –8.83*** I(1) 
Wheat    
      Ln(p) –0.35 –11.02*** I(1) 
      Ln(p*) –2.92** – I(0) 
      Ln(p*) –2.23 –15.35*** I(1) 
Rice    
      Ln(p) –0.99 –10.70*** I(1) 
      Ln(p*) –3.56** – I(0) 
Cotton    
      Ln(p) –2.46 –10.42*** I(1) 
      Ln(p*) –2.60* – I(0) 
Sugar    
      Ln(p) –0.74 –15.77*** I(1) 
      Ln(p*) –1.71 –10.25*** I(1) 
Note: *, ** and *** indicates the significance at 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent respectively. 
1 The optimal lag length p for conducting ADF tests is found by the Schwartz information criteria (SIC). 
The maximum lag length is 14 in case of 216 observations and 13 in case of 177 observations. 
2
 For Wheat and Rice: total observations 216.  
3
 For Cotton and Sugar: total observations 177.  
Now, proceeding most generally, we give a VAR representation to the Equation 
(7), as follows:  
tt
k
t zz
1 
… … … … … … (9) 
where  zt’  =  [ln pt, ln et, ln pt*] ; µ’ = [µ1 , µ2 , µ3 ,] is a vector of constants (linear 
trend in at least some of the variables); and et’ = [e1t , e2t , e3t ].1415Repara-meterisation of 
expression (9) yields: 
ttkt
k
t zzz 1
1
1 
… … … … … (10) 
where the matrix  t   =  –  t+1  –  t+2  – … k , and   k =  – ( I  –  1  –  2   – … k) . If 
all zt are at most I(1), then their first difference is I(0), and therefore the lefthand side of 
expression (10) is clearly stationary. Whether the righthand side of expression (10), 
including the estimated et , is stationary will critically depend on the estimated parameters 
in the matrix  k. Essentially, we are looking for a matrix of vectors, ß (the co-integrating 
vectors), with   a ß’  =   k   (where  a  is a matrix of adjustment coefficients) that will 
ensure that  k  zt–1  =  a ß’  zt–1  is stationary, and thus also the estimated vector of 
residuals  et . These co-integrating vectors will define the long-run relationship between 
the elements of  zt. We follow the Johansen’s approach, based on maximum likelihood 
estimation.   
14These vectors are easily generalised for the case where a support price variable is added.  
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Johansen proposes a test to identify how many linearily independent co-integrating 
vectors might exist, if any; this number is the rank of the (estimated) matrix k.1516   
Table 3 presents the results of the Johansen co-integration test. For all 
commodities, we conclude that there is at most one co-integrating vector. In the case 
of wheat, co-integration is established under the Max Eigen Value test and the Trace 
test at 5 percent confidence. In the case of cotton, co-integration is established at  5 
percent confidence only under the Trace test. And for sugar and rice, the co-
integration is established only at 10 percent, and only under the Max Eigen value test 
for sugar. 
Table 4 lists the co-integrating equations. Note that we have also allowed for an 
intercept in the co-integrating equations. For wheat, all estimated parameters, i.e. 
elasticities, have the right sign; they are close to 1 with high t-statistic for ln e; somewhat 
above 1 with high t-statistic for ln p*; and surprisingly small with low  t-statistic for ln 
p*. The results suggest that the domestic support price (in US$) is a key determinant of 
the domestic price, quite independent from the international price, even in the long-run. 
Indeed, we verified that the Johansen co-integration tests fail to suggest co-integration 
when the price equation excludes the support price variable and considers only the 
international price variable. 
We should recognise that the parameter values for ln p* and ln p* are not fully 
consistent with the theoretical prior in Equation (6) since they add up to more, rather than 
less, than 1. With reference to the theoretical prediction about the pass-through, 
everything else remaining the  same, of an exchange rate depreciation onto the domestic 
price of wheat, those estimated parameter values would suggest a deflationary rather than 
inflationary effect in the long term.  
In the case of sugar, the parameters are close to 1 for ln e but very low for ln p* 
with high t-statistic. In contrast, in the case of cotton and rice, the parameters for ln e and 
ln p* are all close to 1 and with high t-statistics. 
We formally test the hypothesis that the vector of coefficents  [1, –1, –1, 0] for  zt, 
consistent with the “weak” law of one price, belongs to the co-integrating space by 
looking at the ratio between the likelihood function at these values and the maximum 
likelihood value of the Johansen test; this ratio has a  2  distribution. The nul hypothesis 
that the “weak” law of one price applies is, not surprisngly, strongly rejected  in the case 
of wheat and sugar, while it cannot be rejected in the case of rice and cotton (see last 
right-hand side column of Table 2). 
Empirical studies have looked at the applicability of the law of one price in the 
case of individual homogenous commodities (see for instance Ardeni, (op-cit.) and 
Mundlak and Larson (1992). How do our results compared with results obtained for the 
same agricultural commodities among countries which can perhaps be considered models 
in terms of competitive market functioning?  Ardeni found that while the estimated 
elasticities for a group of domestic commodity prices in the United States, United 
Kingdom, and Australia with respect to import parity prices are generally close to unity, 
including  in  the  case  of  wheat  and  sugar,  co-integration  tests  in  fact  often failed to   
15Note that the lag length in expression (10) will be selected using the Hannan-Quinn and Schwartz 
Information Criterion.  
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Table 3   
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Table 4 
Cointegrating Equations  
Wheat Cotton Sugar Rice 
A. Number of cointegrating vectors r =1 r = 1 r =1 r = 1 
B. coefficients on cointegrating vector variables  Vector 1 Vector 1 Vector 1 Vector 1 
Constant 0.61 2.18 –2.14 1.13 
ln(e) –0.94 –1.28 –1.04 –1.15  
(-22.80) (–11.69) (–11.36) (–16.06) 
ln(p*) –1.50 – – –  
(–8.19)    
ln(p*) –0.04 –1.26 –0.29 –1.06  
(–0.48) (–7.93) (–2.69) (–6.32) 
ln(p) 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Log Likelihood 1909.17 1042.26 975.57 1385.51 
Note: Numbers in parenthesis are t-statistics.  
suggest co-integration.1617But there were exceptions, including for wheat and tea, for 
which co-integration was established (at 5 percent confidence). 
Mundlak and Larson found that domestic prices elasticities with respect to the 
international prices (in US dollars) and the exchange rate for a group of 57 countries and 
60 commodities had median values of 0.95 and 0.97, respectively, suggesting strong 
transmission.1718 For wheat alone, they found that that while the elasticity of the domestic 
price (this time expressed in US$) with respect to the international price (in US$) 
averaged 0.65 among the same group of countries, it was only 0.10 in Pakistan, by far the 
lowest within that group. This result is consistent with ours. 
We conclude from these comparisons that the very large departures from the (weak) 
law of  one price for wheat and sugar in Pakistan appear to reflect Pakistan-specific market 
imperfections in the case of these two commodities rather than a more general failure. 
There is a close relationship between co-integration and error correction models in 
the sense that error correction models generally “underpin” co-integration, although co-
integration could exist without strong evidence of an error correction model at work. The 
estimated error correction model directly associated with the Johansen co-integration test 
and the co-integrating equations reported in Tables 3 and 4 are shown in Table 5. These 
short-run equations for  zt coincide to expression (10) estimated at the co-integrating 
vector. All the estimated coefficients attached to the error correction term are of the right 
(negative) sign with fairly high  t-statistics (except in the case of rice). The standard 
errors of the equation are not bad for wheat and rice but rather high for cotton and sugar; 
and the R2 are low, except perhaps for wheat. 
The conclusion is that these error correction models only partially represent the 
complex short-run price dynamics. Needless to say, this conclusion correlates with the 
relative weak evidence of co-integration. Nevertheless, the short-run equations for  zt 
could still be used for period-ahead forecasting.  
16Unfortunately, cotton and rice are not part of the author’s sample of commodities. 
17For Pakistan, the elasticities are, respectively, 0.82 and 0.44. The latter is somewhat at variance with 
the results we obtained here, which consistently suggest an elasticity with respect to the exchange rate closer to 
one. But this may be due to the very different exchange rate system prevailing in Pakistan during the period 
covered by the data in Mundlak and Larson study (1968–1978).  
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Table 5 
VECM Estimates 
Error Correction Variables  Wheat Cotton Sugar Rice 
Dependent Variable 
   ln(p) 
Independent Variables 
   Constant 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00  
(3.74) (1.01) (0.74) (2.21) 
   ln(e
-1) –0.11 0.07 0.65 0.05  
(–0.81) (0.15) (1.72) (0.38) 
   ln(e
-2) 0.03 –0.20 –0.07 –0.03  
(0.19) (–0.45) (–0.19) (–0.22) 
   ln(p*
-1) –0.04 – – –  
(–0.88)    
   ln(p*
-2) –0.05 – – –  
(–1.12)    
   ln(p*
-1) –0.03 0.38 0.13 –0.03  
(–0.95) (2.45) (1.85) (–1.55) 
   ln(p*
-2) 0.07 –0.04 0.09 0.01  
(2.10) (–0.26) (1.26) (0.64) 
   ln(p
-1) 0.24 0.19 –0.15 0.26  
(3.69) (2.21) (–1.78) (3.77) 
   ln(p
-2) –0.07 –0.12 0.03 0.18  
(–1.19) (–1.36) (0.32) (2.56) 
ECT1 –0.10 –0.12 –0.09 –0.00  
(–5.40) (–2.51) (–1.95) (–0.12) 
Key Statistics   
   S.E. of Equation 0.02 0.07 0.06 0.02 
   R2 0.22 0.15 0.11 0.13 
Note: Numbers in parenthesis are t-statistics.   
5.  CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
There is only weak evidence of the existence of  long-run co-integrating equations 
between domestric price, international price, exchange rate, and (when applicable) 
domestic support price (in foreign currency terms) for key agricultural commodities in 
Pakistan. The co-integration tests appear especially weak for sugar and rice, while in the 
case of wheat, the stronger evidence of co-integration is mostly on account of the 
inclusion of the support price.  
Within co-integration, domestic prices, at least for wheat and sugar do seem to 
have a “life of their own” in the sense that they are far from directly reflecting the 
prevailing international parity prices, even in the long-run, and allowing for a systematic 
wedge between domestic and international parity prices. The long-run elasticities to 
changes in international prices are very low for both these commodities. In the case of 
wheat, the empirical analysis suggests that the domestic support price (in foreign 
currency terms) has been a key independent explanatory variable, even in the long-run.  
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In the case of rice and cotton, the long-run elasticites to changes in international 
prices are much larger, and close to unity.  
For all commodities, the long-run elasticities to changes in the exchange rate are 
around unity. 
The above findings are consistent with the theory we proposed to explain how 
domestic prices adjust to domestic and external shocks. They generally support the 
theoretical prediction that monetary/ exchange shocks are more likely to be passed-
through than real (including international price) shocks. Nevertheless  a “weak” 
applicability of the law of one price in the long-run cannot be rejected for cotton and rice 
under some standard confidence interval.  
Estimation of equations governing the short-run domestic price dynamics are 
imbedded in the Johansen co-integration test based on a VAR, and have the form of an 
error correction mechanism. These equations could be used for period-ahead forecasting 
based on full information up to then. Admittedly, however, the explanatory power of 
these short-run equations is rather weak, except in the case of wheat.       
Policy implications of this paper are twofold.  
The first relates to market efficiency. The fact that the departures from the law 
of one price even in the long-run appear to be very substantial in the case of wheat 
and sugar in Pakistan, significantly more so than elsewhere, point to the role of 
government interventions and weaknesses of competitive mechanisms on these 
markets, and the room for further market-oriented reforms in these areas. While, the 
government might argue that it intervenes as a price stabiliser (for both the consumer 
and producer), the well established long-lasting effect of shocks to international 
prices for these and other commodities have casted doubts on whether such price 
stabiliser function is optimal from the welfare and efficiency point of view.  In any 
case, it is not clear why short-run interventions should pre-empt the long-run 
applicability of the law of one price.   
The second relate to inflation forecasting. Under the current modus operandi of  
commodity markets in Pakistan, any monetary policy framework, say inflation targeting, 
cannot take for granted the assumption that domestic prices of even highly homogenous 
traded goods such as agricultural commodities will directly reflect the exchange rate and 
international price. Rather, how changes in these variables will be passed-through into the 
domestic prices could depend on the sources of such changes and the prevailing political 
economy of markets functioning and related government interventions. The short-run 
price equations modeled in this paper are examples of dynamic price equations which 
could be part of an inflation forecasting model.   
Finally, the attempt to isolate domestic prices for agricultural commodities from 
variations in the international prices, for wheat in particular through the support price 
mechanism, would hamper the macroeconomic adjustment to terms of trade shocks 
(international prices of wheat, cotton, rice, and sugar relative to the international prices 
for major imported inputs). Specifically, the expected equilibrium real appreciation/ 
depreciation of the currency as a result of a positive/ adverse terms of trade          
shock1819might not take place, resulting in greater instability of the trade balance.   
18See for instance Cashin, et al. (2002). 
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Annex I 
Definition of Variables and Sources   
Source 
Exchange Rate  
  e Official exchange rate (annual average 
PRs per US Dollar) 
International Financial Statistics (IFS) 
Wheat  
  p Domestic Price of Wheat (PRs/40kgs) Ministry of Food, Agriculture & Livestock 
(Minfal) 
  p* Wheat US Gulf Price  (US$/40kgs) International Financial Statistics (IFS) 
  p* Support Price of Wheat (US$/40kgs)1920 Ministry of Food, Agriculture & Livestock 
(Minfal) 
Rice  
  p Domestic Price of Irri-Rice (PRs/40kgs) Ministry of Food, Agriculture & Livestock 
(Minfal) 
  p* Thailand: Rice Price  (US$/40kgs) International Financial Statistics (IFS) 
Cotton  
  p Domestic Cotton Spot Price (PRs/40kgs) Federal Bureau of Statistics (FBS) 
  p* Cotton Liverpool Price  (US$/40kgs) International Financial Statistics (IFS) 
Sugar  
  p Domestic Refined Sugar (PRs/50kgs) Federal Bureau of Statistics (FBS) 
  p* Caribbean Sugar Price  (US$/50kgs) International Financial Statistics (IFS) 
 
Time Period 
The data used for all the commodities is on monthly basis. 
Wheat : 1987M01 – 2004M12 (216 observations) 
Rice : 1987M01 – 2004M12 (216 observations) 
Cotton : 1991M07 – 2006M03 (177 observations) 
Sugar : 1991M07 – 2006M03 (177 observations)                                                                                                                                                                 
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